If exploited, these flaws can allow attackers to gain unauthorized access to sensitive information or generally cause problems
A group of researchers from universities in China and the United States have identified a new vulnerability in Intel processors that leads to the leakage of information about the outcome of speculative operations through third-party channels, which can be used, for example, to set up a hidden communication channel between processes or detect leaks during Meltdown attacks.
The essence of the vulnerability is a change in the processor's EFLAGS register, which occurred as a result of speculative instruction execution, affecting the subsequent execution time of JCC instructions (jump when specified conditions are met).
Speculative operations are not completed and the result is discarded , but the discarded EFLAGS change can be determined by analyzing the execution time of the JCC instructions. Pre-jump comparison operations performed speculatively, if the comparison is successful, result in a small delay that can be measured and used as a feature for content matching.
The transient execution attack is a type of attack exploiting the vulnerability of CPU optimization technologies. New attacks emerge quickly. The side channel is a key part of transient execution attacks to exfiltrate data.
In this work, we discovered a vulnerability that changed the EFLAGS register in transient execution that may have a side effect on the Jcc (Jump Condition Code) instruction on Intel CPUs. Based on our discovery, we propose a new side channel attack that exploits transient execution timing and Jcc instructions to deliver data.
This attack encrypts secret data by changing the registry which causes the execution time to be slightly slower and which can be measured by the attacker to decode data. This attack does not depend on the cache system.
Unlike other similar attacks through third-party channels, the new method does not analyze the change in access time to cached and uncached data and does not require the stage of resetting the EFLAGS registry to the initial state, making it harder to detect and block the attack.
As a demonstration , the researchers implemented a variant of the Meltdown attack , using a new method to obtain information about the outcome of a speculative trade. The method for orchestrating the information leak during a Meltdown attack was successfully demonstrated on systems with Intel Core i7-6700 and i7-7700 CPUs running Ubuntu 22.04 and Linux 5.15. On a system with an Intel i9-10980XE CPU, the attack was only partially successful.
The Meltdown vulnerability is based on the fact that during speculative instruction execution , the processor can access a private data area and then discard the result, since the established privileges prohibit such access from the user process.
In a program, a speculatively executed block is separated from the main code by a conditional jump, which in real conditions is always triggered, but due to the fact that the conditional statement uses a computed value that is not known to the processor during preemptive code. execution, all branch options are executed speculatively.
In classic Meltdown, since the same cache is used for speculatively executed operations as for normally executed instructions, it is possible during speculative execution to set markers in the cache that reflect the contents of individual bits in a closed memory area, and then in normally executed code to determine its meaning through analysis of access time to cached and uncached data.
The new variant uses changes in the EFLAGS register as a marker for a leak. In the Covert Channel demonstration, one process modulated the data being sent to change the contents of the EFLAGS register, and another process analyzed the change at the JCC runtime to recreate the data sent by the first process.
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